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INTRODUCTION
William Faulkner and S¢ren Kierkegaard, although
separated in time by almost a century, possess a common
concern: both are deeply interested in the numerous ways
in which individuals live out their lives in either hope
or despair.

Exploring the avenues which might alleviate

this despair and providing a basis for hope are tasks
both authors have accepted as theirs.
This paper relates three novels by Faulkner to the
stages of existence set forth by Kierkegaard in much of
his philosophical writing.

I intend to show that Faulk-

ner's characters serve as illustrations of different
ways in which an individual may exist in these stages.
The result of a juxtaposition of these characters with
Kierkegaard's stages of existence is a greater insight
into the motivations, the obsessions, and the successes
and failures of Faulknerian characters.
The three novels I have chosen for this task are
The Sound and the Fury,
Absalom!

Light in August, and Absalom,

In each of his novels, Faulkner presents dif-

ferent characters who cope with life in very different
ways.

The novels I have selected, however, provide the

same diversity with which Kierkegaard himself illustrates
1
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his stages.

Although many of the major characters in

the selected novels dwell in the same stage of existence, the various ways in which they inhabit the same
stage are illuminating.
Chapter one is a discussion of the three stages
of existence set forth by Kierkegaard.

This chapter

provides the background upon which the following chapters are based.

The subsequent chapters show how the

characters in each novel exemplify Kierkegaard's stages.
Chapter two, a discussion of The Sound and the Fury, illustrates that most of the characters in this novel
dwell in Kierkegaard's aesthetical stage, but not in
identical ways.

One character reaches a slightly higher

stage: the aesthetic-ethical; and there is one character
who reaches the religious stage, a phenomenon which both
Kierkegaard and Faulkner consider rare, but which Kierkegaard considers absolutely necessary for the most meaningful existence.

Chapter three is a discussion of

Light in August and the ways in which two of the major

characters in this novel exist in either the aesthetical,
'

the aesthetic-ethical, or the ethical stage.

Chapter

four is a discussion of Absalom, Absalom! and Thomas
Sutpen, the character who dominates the book.

In his

personality, characteristics of both the aesthete and
the ethicist are evident; therefore, he inhabits the
aesthetic-ethical stage.

The conclusion brings together

3

the characters who exist in the same stage and compares
and contrasts those characters as they exemplify different ways of dwelling in the aesthetical, the ethical,
and the religious stages.

The result is the creation

of a Kierkegaardian structure using the individual characters previously discussed.

CHAPTER I
STAGES OF EXISTENCE
S¢ren Kierkegaard is considered the forerunner of
existential philosophy.

To exemplify what he calls

"stages" or "spheres" of existence, he presents numerous
characters who represent diverse attitudes which individuals may assume toward their own being.

The charac-

ters in Faulkner's novels illustrate further these same
stages of existence.

More important, however, is the

illumination a Kierkegaardian reading provides in the
understanding of Faulkner's characters.

When Kierke-

gaard's stages are used to classify Faulkner's characters, the reader begins to see more clearly why so many
of these characters seem doomed to failure.

Similarly,

those characters who manage to succeed manage to do so
because of the higher stage of existence which they have
reached.
Kierkegaard presents nis stages through various
pseudonymous characters.

These characters are either

reputed to be authors of entire books by Kierkegaard or
publishers of books which include the works of other
pseudonymous authors.

Ronald Grimsley explains the

significance of the pseudonymns in this way:
4
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By the use of pseudonymns . • . Kierkegaard was depicting certain aspects of existence which, though bearing some resemblance
to the imaginative possibilities of his own
being, never corresponded exactly to his true
self and were, in any case, intended primarily
as objective descriptions and typical examples
of particular stages of human existence. As
such, they had an absolute and "ideal" quality
lacking in any ordinary individual.
In this
way Kierkegaard was able to set a certain
distance between himself and his work, and to
consider it as something with which he was
not personally identified in any narrow sense,
but which none the less contained some of his
deepest convictions about the meaning of human
existence • • . . By means of his pseudonymous
authorship Kierkegaard was also hoping to
forestall the objection that he was parading
before the public as a teacher who ought to
be heeded in his own right; by concealing his
identity, he made his own personal involvement
or lack of it irrelevant to the validity of
his message. 1
According to Kierkegaard, there are three distinct
stages of existence in which a man might dwell: the
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.

The first

of these, the aesthetic, is the stage of sensuousness
and objectivity.

Judge William, one of the pseudonyms,

sees the sensual as momentary and transient.

2

The per-

son who dwells in this stage seeks instant gratification;
consequently, this stage is·correctly associated with
lust.

In fact, Judge William's discussion of the aes-

thete is addressed to a young man who pursues a life of
eroticism.

An important consideration, however, is the

fact that the aesthete characteristically finds meaning
for his existence in external stimuli and depends upon

6

these stimuli for making sense out of his environment.
Granted, the external stimulus is often in the form of
a beautiful woman and has erotic associations, but this
is not the only kind of appeal to which the aesthete
responds.

The pleasures of Kierkegaard's aesthete are

not restricted to physical pleasures.

As George Bedell

observes, "They may include the highly sophisticated objectivity of a philosopher as well as the sensualism of
a Don Juan." 3 *

It is interesting to note that Kierke-

gaard uses the terms sensual and aesthetic interchangeably and restricts neither to the erotic.

Speaking of

the reluctance of a man to be torn away from the delusion of happiness and shown the truth, he explains the
reluctance in this way: "The reason is that the sensuous
nature and the psycho-sensuous completely dominate him;
the reason is that he lives in the sensuous categories
agreeable/disagreeable, and says goodby to truth, etc.;
the reason is that he is too sensuous to have the courage to be spirit or to endure it." 4

Sensuousness, im-

mediacy, and aestheticism are all terms Kierkegaard

uses to denote the individual who lives for the moment
and finds meaning for his existence outside himself.

An essential characteristic of the aesthete, per*The philosopher, who thinks about life without
making choices, thereby maintains an objective detachment from life~an aesthetic characteristic discussed in
the next paragraph.

7

haps as important as sensuousness, is objectivity.

Al-

though the terms seem to imply a contradiction, none
exists as Kierkegaard uses them.

The aesthete wants to

maintain a detachment from other people and from life.
He has no objection to being loved, but he avoids giving
love in return.

Friendship, according to "A" (an aes-

thetic pseudonym), is to be strictly avoided, and one
must never enter into the relationship of marriage.
Furthermore, "A" believes that one only enjoys that
which one can control.

It is important, then, that one

always control his moods and avoid sentimentality.

5

This reasoning leads the aesthete to think of other people and his own body as objects, both to be con.trolled
and manipulated.
ous

Because of his dependence on the sensu-

and on the moment, which is continually vanishing,

his choice of his body is neither serious nor permanent.
His body is important only in an uncertain way.

As

Kierkegaard puts it, "The immediate man . . . is merely
soulishly determined, his self or he himself is a something included along with 'the other' in the compass of
the temporal and the worldly, and it has only an illusory appearance of possessing in it something eternal.
Thus the self coheres immediately with 'the other,'
wishing, desiring, enjoying, etc., but passively . .
Its dialectic is: the agreeable and the disagreeable;
its concepts are: good fortune, misfortune, fate."

6
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The aesthete puts himself at the mercy of fate.
He considers events either fortunate or unfortunate, depending on how he is affected by them.

He never assumes

responsibility for his actions and usually thinks of
himself as the one things are done to rather than as the
one who does.

"He is not in control of his destiny;

something else is." 7
The aesthete may respond to suffering in several
ways.

He may cherish suffering as a way to avoid choos-

ing the person he will be; he may turn his back on suffering and pretend it does not exist; or he may allow
himself to be overcome by and thus determined by it.
But no matter which attitude he assumes, he will consider suffering as an effect caused by something externalto himself and accidental to his true nature.

Suf-

fering or not suffering becomes a matter of fortune or
misfortune, a matter over which he has no control.
Kierkegaard believes that if one dwells in the
aesthetical mode of existence, the only possible result
is despair.

The ability to choose is of major impor-

.
tance.

But the aesthete avoids making decisions; indeed,

he believes that he has no choice and is thereby himself
responsible for his inability to choose and for his despair.

Above all, the aesthete wishes to maintain a de-

tached view of life; and, because of this dissociation,
he finds life empty and meaningless.

He tries to evade

9

the demands of time and concentrates instead on the
pleasures of the moment.

Despair results when the pres-

ent moment is considered all there is.

Or, as Kirke-

gaard puts it, "To despair is to lose the eternal." 8
The second stage of existence in Kierkegaard's
classification is the ethical.

The person who exists

in this stage is governed by the demands of universal
law.
self.

He believes that he can choose his best or ideal
The ethical person has great confidence in his

ability to

choose~he

what is good.

chooses the good because he knows

His life is shaped in keeping with the

demands and principles of society.

"The paradigm of

this modality is marriage and especially the marriage
vows • . . . the ethical person believes he can choose
his partner with complete and absolute ingenuousness.
He also believes that marital sex is the basic symbol of
the conjugal alliance; his relationship to his body is
therefore entirely instrumental." 9
The aesthete objects vigorously to the ethicist's
claims for marriage.

According to "A", the promise

couples make to love each other eternally has no meaning: if love will end in time, it will also end in
eternity.

He thinks the promise might be valid if the

couple promised "until Easter, or until May-day comes"
instead.

But his major objection is that one loses his

freedom in marriage.

"Marriage brings one into fatal

10
connection with custom and tradition, and traditions
and customs are like the wind and weather, altogether
incalculable." 10

The aesthete will have nothing what-

ever to do with the demands of society or with duty.
The ethical person, like the aesthete, considers
the source of suffering to be fate, but his attitude toward it is different.
ing in some way.

He struggles to overcome suffer-

He will deliberately choose suffering

as a way of confirming himself.

Suffering becomes an

integral part of his basic self.
Since the ethical incorporates the attempt to recognize human potentiality, it is considered the most humanistic of the stages.

Self-realization is the goal of

the ethical man, and he must seek this realization within himself.

His search for self-realization and the

ethical stage must be based on an obedience to the dictates of duty.

In order to progress beyond this stage,

he must eventually reach a point of resignation, for "to
resign oneself is to make the final choice, and in doing
so, to pull the fangs of despair.

Resignation is,

therefore, the act in which ·the absolute self is chosen
absolutely; it is created; it comes into being." 11

This

is the resignation of absolute choice, the choice to
pursue life regardless of its flaws.

It is an absolute

choice as far as Kierkegaard is concerned because it
leads to the "leap" into religiousness.

In other words,

11

although it is an ethical choice, it is a means of releasing oneself from ethical despair.
Obviously, then, the ethical stage, though more
satisfactory than the aesthetic, is not to be considered the highest aim.

With its emphasis on human capa-

bility, it has no place for the concept of sin; and because it has no place for this concept, it ultimately
fails.

Johannes de Silentio, pseudonymous author of

Fear and Trembling, explains this way:

The ethical as such is the universal, and
as the universal it applies to everyone
. • Conceived immediately as physical
and psychical, the particular individual is
the individual who has his telos* in the
universal, and his ethical task is to express himself constantly in it. • • .As ~oon
as the individual would assert himself in
his particularity over against the universal
he sins, and only by recognizing this can he
again reconcile himself with the universal. 12
But the ethical

individ~al,

unless he is willing through

resignation to choose the religious stage, cannot accept
the concept of sin.

His duty is to society; whereas the

idea of sin requires a duty to God.

Anti-Climacus,

pseudonymous author of Training in Christianity, is even
more emphatic than Johannes: "Only the consciousness of
sin is the expression of absolute respect .

.

. because

Christianity requires absolute respect . . . only consciousness of sin is the way of entrance [into Chris-

*End or fulfillment.

12
tianity].

II

l 3

The third and final stage of existence is the religious, which is related to the absurd and the paradoxical, both of which are related to the fact that the
eternal has been embodied in time.

In Kierkegaard's

words, "The eternal truth has come into being in time:
this is the paradox . • . . the eternal essential truth is
not behind him but in front of him, through its being in
existence or having existed, so that, if the individual
does not existentially and in existence lay hold of the
truth, he will never lay hold of it." 14

Kierkegaard

explains further by defining the absurd in similar
terms: "The absurd is-that the

eternal truth has come

into being in time, that God has come into being, has
been born, has grown up, and so forth, has come into being precisely like any other individual human being,
quite indistinguishable from other individuals.

1115

Kierkegaard cites two ways of dwelling in the religious stage: "religiousness A" and "religiousness B."
In religiousness A, the individual is "self-consciously
a part of history but allows himself to be destroyed as
an existing individual in order that God may have his
way in the world • • . . Because he finds his own selfhood
as obstruction to a relationship with God, the self must
be annihilated.

He sees a complete identification of

time with eternity and worships an immanental God." 16

13
In this type of religiousness, nature and history are
especially important, and sacraments and ritual become
highly significant.

Religiousness A does not represent

Kierkegaard's mature view of religion.

He later came

to understand the paradoxical religion of religiousness
Bas the heart of Christianity.

17

In religiousness B, the individual is not destroyed.

He is in the world but not of it.

The world

no longer controls him, but "he does not feel compelled
to remove himself from the world in order that God may
appear." 18

He understands fully that the eternal is

embodied in time, and this understanding gives new meaning to the relationship of time and eternity.

Existence

becomes a process of working toward God while discovering at the same time that God has already come.
The religious person deliberately chooses suffering and considers it something worthwhile in itself.
Although the ethical individual also chooses suffering
deliberately, his motives are different.

He chooses it

because he considers a choice of suffering a heroic
choice, a way of affirming his worth.

In making this

choice, he hopes to wipe out the accidental quality inherent in fate, the cause of his suffering.

His choice

is therefore a resistance, not an acquiescence.

The re-

ligious person, on the other hand, considers suffering
an essential part of his lot in life.

The choice of

14
suffering is a part of his choice to accept life with
all of its flaws.

"He has passed through the strenuous

stage of resignation and ideality and has once more
been able to choose the finite (suffering) by virtue of
the fact that the Eternal has made itself known to him
in the midst of the finite (and, incidentally, in the
form of suffering).

Suffering . • . is part and parcel

of finite existence where God is known." 19

Existence

becomes a matter of assuming a new posture before suffering rather than of learning to cope with suffering.
The important thing is not the immanental or direct relationship to God emphasized in religiousness A, but
"becoming edified through a new kind of eternal.i t y putting oneself at the disposal of the Infinite who appears as the finite.

Which means, very simply yet de-

ceptively, to serve one's fellows.

One suffers because

that is the way it is; one suffers because God was made
flesh.

1120

Suffering is worthwhile for the person in

religiousness B because in serving one's fellows, one
also serves God.
Resignation, the final step necessary before the
"leap" into religiousness, requires both courage and
fortitude.

It is not, however, a

~esult

of faith.

It

is dependent upon what is within the individual, not
upon a sovereign power beyond him.

It is the will to

choose and thus prevents the ethical individual from

15
slipping back into the aesthetical stage.

Faith, on

the other hand, is something that the individual receives; it is not necessary to renounce anything in
faith.

Courage is required, but not the kind of cour-

age that requires an act of the will.

It is the cour-

age to accept graciously that which is bestowed upon
one, whether he deserves or desires it or not.

The in-

dividual is again at the mercy of the external, but
this time the external is in the form of God.
Kierkegaard does not specifically outline the relationship between the three stages; however, certain
conclusions may be drawn.

Walter Lowrie, in his intro-

duction to Stages on Life's Way, has made several observations:
We need in fact to be warned not to regard
the three stages as a prescribed curriculum
which one must pass through in advancing
from youth to age. Such is not S.K.'s
meaning. He is not so foolish as to think
that one must be an unhappy exception . .
in order to attain the religious stage~
any more than one must first be a seducer
in order to become a proper ma~ried man
like the Judge. Neither does he represent
that one stage must be definitely left behind before a man enters upon the next.
He affirms in fact of the aesthetic that
it is never superseded but only "dethroned''
. • . . S.K. defines the three spheres only
in the briefest and most general terms, but
he is copious in depicting the characters
who exemplify them.
They do not exemplify
any stage purely, as a logical system would
require, for they represent the existential
possibilities which lie between immediacy
and spirit. The logical delimitation of
the spheres is confounded by the movement
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in which each individual is involved, the
direction of this movement is the prime
consideration, and this is aptly indicated
by the word "stages." "There are many
ways which lead to the same truth, and
each man takes his own." So said S. K. in
the first of the Three Discourses which
accompanied this book. 21
Frater Taciturnus, another of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms,

enlightens us further by explaining that the

ethical stage is one of transition, but that one does
not necessarily pass through it only once.

22

An indi-

vidual might therefore vacillate between the aesthetical
and the ethical stages several times before reaching the
religious stage; he might never reach the religious
stage; or he might live in either the ethical or the
aesthetical stage without ever moving to the other.
Moreover, though the ethical and the aesthetical are
necessarily preliminary· to the religious stage (one is
not created in the religious stage from birth}, it is
impossible to reach another stage by mere development.
Only through the Kierkegaardian "leap" can the movement
to another stage be accomplished.

A logical progression

from the aesthetical throug4 the ethical to the religious stage is possible, but this type of progression is
neither necessary nor preferable.
For Kierkegaard, existence is a state of becoming.
The task of every individual is to become himself, and
he can perform this task only by means of a relationship to God.

If he fails, he is in despair, whether

17
he knows it or not.

Kierkegaard puts it this way:

" ... a self, every instant it exists, is in process
of becoming, for the self . . . does not actually exist,
it is only that which it is to become.

In so far as the

self does not become itself, it is not its own self; but
not to be one's own self is despair." 23

The paradoxical

nature of this statement is explained by Kierkegaard's
belief that the self is a synthesis of two factors, one
of which is constantly the opposite of the other.

This

synthesis consists of the finite, which is the limiting
factor, and the infinite, which is the expanding factor.
Thus, because of the finitude inherent in man's nature,
he must be himself; and because of the infinitude inherent in his nature, he must become himself.

Kierkegaard

is therefore convinced that the individual who has reached
the religious stage, though he feels no impulse to go
further than becoming a Christian, feels an impulse to
go further in becoming a Christian. 2 ~
It is clear that, according to Kierkegaard, the
ultimate end of living in the aesthetical or the ethical
stage is disappointment at the least or, more likely,
despair.

Specifically,

Every human existence which is not conscious of
itself before God as spirit, every human existence which is not thus grounded transparently
in God but obscurely reposes or terminates in
some abstract universality . . • or which, in
obscurity about itself, takes its faculties
merely as active powers, without in a deeper
sense being conscious whence it has them, which
regards itself as an inexplicable something

18

which is to be understood per se--every
such existence, whatever it accomplishes,
though it be the most amazing exploit, whatever it explains, though it were the whole
of existence, however intensely it enjoys
life aesthetically--every such existence is
after all despair. 25
Those who live satisfactory lives are those who have
managed to reach the stage of religiousness.
Although a comparison of the beliefs of Faulkner
and Kierkegaard is not the primary concern of this study,
there are certain parallels which are relevant.

Both

writers are concerned with the problem of alienation.
There is evidence in Faulkner's works that this alienation is caused by a failure to establish meaningful relationships with God and with other people, while at the
same time maintaining one's individuality and one's freedom.

Quentin Compson, Jason Compson, Joe Christmas, and

Thomas Sutpen are all examples of characters who are
alienated from their surroundings through a failure to
relate themselves meaningfully to God and to other people.

Dilsey is an example of the reverse: she does not

experience alienation because she manages to establish
meaningful relationships.
Kierkegaard's view is similar to Faulkner's.

He

also extols the worth of the individual: "I broke with
the public not out of pride and arrogance, etc.,
but because I was conscious of being a religious author
and as such was concerned with 'the individual'
individual'~in

('the

contrast to 'the public'), a thought in

19
which is contained an entire philosophy of life and of
the world." 26
As for alienation, Kierkegaard attributes it primarily to man's failure to relate himself properly to
God.

Alienation is eliminated through love: "If anyone

. . . will not learn from Christianity to love himself
in the right way, then neither can he love his neighbor;
he may perhaps .

'for life and death' cling to one

or several other human beings, but this is by no means
loving one's neighbor.

To love one's self in the right

way and to love one's neighbor are absolutely analogous
concepts, are at bottom one and the same." 27
In The Point of View for My Work as an

Au~hor,

Kierkegaard asserts that he was always a religious author, even when he wrote his most aesthetic works.

28

The aesthetic works were written because he believed
that, in order to instruct men and bring them into contact with the religious stage, he must first get in
touch with them by beginning where most of them are.
In other words, he must begin with aesthetic achievement.

29

Religion·is important to Faulkner also:

"I'm not

talking about a personified or a mechanical God, but a
God who is the most complete expression of mankind, a
.God who rests both in eternity and the now . . • • There
is only the present moment, in which I include both the

20
past and the future, and that is eternity."

3

°

Faulk-

ner's view here is essentially the same as Kierkegaard's
assertion that the eternal is embodied in time.

A paral-

lel exists also in the fact that Faulkner, in refuting a
personified God, does the same thing that Kierkegaard
does in refuting the immanental or direct relationship
to God:
All paganism consists in this, that God is
related to man directly, as the extraordinary
is to the astonished observer.
But the spiritual relationship to God in the truth, i.e.,
in inwardness, is conditioned by a prior irruption of inwardness, which corresponds to
the divine elusiveness that God has absolutely
nothing obvious about Him, that God is so far
from being obvious, that .He is invisible.
It
cannot immediately occur to anyone that He
exists, although His invisibility is again
His omnipresence. 31
·
Another parallel can be seen in Faulkner's attitude toward suffering.

This parallel is evident in

Faulkner's works: "Faulkner's noblest characters,"
Cleanth Brooks has noted, "are willing to face the fact
that most men can learn the deepest truths about themselves and about reality only through suffering.

Hurt

and pain and loss are not me.re accidents to which the
human being is subject; nor are they mere punishments
incurred by human error; they can be the means to the
deeper knowledge and to the more abundant life." 32

If

many of Faulkner's characters fail to achieve the more
abundant life, it is partially because they do not

21
assume the proper attitude toward suffering.

Those

characters who accept suffering as their lot in life
without allowing it to plunge them into despair are the
ones who are able to reach the highest stages of existence.
In The Sound and the Fury, in Light in August,
and in Absalom, Absalom! the appearance of the essentially religious character is either rare or nonexistent.

The infrequent appearance of the religious

character in Faulkner is not in contradiction to
Kierkegaard's view of the situation of mankind.

Ac-

cording to Kierkegaard, most people who call themselves
Christians are not Christians at all: "If then.·
the greater number of people in Christendom only imagine
themselves to be Christians, in what categories do they
live?

They live in aesthetic, or at the most, in

aesthetic-ethical categories." 33

In Faulkner's novels

also, the aesthetic and the aesthetic-ethical categories predominate.

CHAPTER II
THE SOUNV ANV THE FURY

The Sound and the Fury, a study in "the fragmenta-

tion of modern man," 3 ~ presents characters who, for the
most part, dwell in Kierkegaard's aesthetical stage.
Both Quentin and Jason inhabit this stage, but not in
the same manner.

Mr. and Mrs. Compson, also, have their

particular manners of dwelling in the aesthetical stage;
and, to a certain extent, so does Caddy.

Just as there

are various ways of dwelling in the aesthetical stage
(and in the ethical),

35

the effects upon different per-

sons dwelling in this stage will be somewhat diverse.
For example, Quentin, Jason, and Caddy have problems
with their attitudes toward time.
the past; Jason's, the future.

Quentin's problem is

Caddy inhabits the pres-

ent, concentrating on the pleasures of the moment.

Each

attitude is an aesthetic one in that not one of these
characters sees the eternar embodied in time.
Quentin's problem is that he never makes a fundamental choice regarding his own being.
ternal

circumstances~the

He allows ex-

past of childhood and youth

in general and his sister Caddy's loss of innocence in
that past

specifically~to

22

dominate and even possess

23
every act in the present.

Reality is the enemy.

Quen-

tin will go to any lengths to deny the validity of life
as it is, and the lengths to which he will go are illustrated in his relationship to Caddy.

In reference

to their "incest" he thinks, "Because if it were just
to hell; if that were all of it.
just finished themselves.
and me.

Finished.

If things

Nobody else there but her

If we could just have done something so dread-

ful that they would have fled hell except us." 36
following is also pertinent:
hell beyond that:
than dead.

The

"If it could just be a

the clean flame the two of us more

Then you will have

onl~

me then the two of

us amid the pointing and the horror beyond the clean
flame"

(p. 135).

He wants to wipe out the reality of

Caddy's loss of innocence, to deny that Caddy is "bad,"
as she says.

But more than that, the ideas of the

"clean flame," of things finishing themselves, and of
being "more than dead'' indicate a desire on Quentin's
part to become an object and to make an object of
Caddy also.

The ideas are counter to meaningful exis-

tence because, to Kierkegaard, existence is by nature a
state of becoming.

The aesthete in effect denies exis-

tence by refusing to exercise his ability to choose.
One cannot become anything without making a choice.
Quentin's refusal to exercise this ability assures his
alienation from God and from himself.
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The aesthete, according to Judge William, wishes
above all to remain outside himself.
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Quentin's in-

wardness is the quality necessary to leap into the ethical stage, but he refuses to exercise the power of
choice which would make the leap possible.

He wants to

avoid the choice between aesthetic and ethical existence
by avoiding himself, and becoming an object would accomplish both purposes.

His sense of guilt, whether well-

founded or not, makes inwardness too painful for him.
Getting outside himself (in effect, becoming an object)
would eliminate the pain he now feels; and if he could
make an object of Caddy also, both would be safe from
the guilt and unpleasantness suggested by his

~xpression

"the pointing and the horror" of life.
Quentin is not actually sexually attracted to his
sister.

The world the two of them inhabited as children

is established in his memory as an idyllic place where
things are perfect and good.

The reality of the present

is too much for him to bear, but he realizes (though
dimly) the impossibility of an actual return to the
past.

What he longs for is the innocent Caddy, and he

wants her to belong to him alone.

Since the innocent

Caddy no longer exists, his only alternative is to have
her belong to him in
incest.

sin~if

he could have committed

But since this act is as repulsive to him as

what Caddy has done, perhaps saying it will be enough.

25
When his father asks if he tried to get Caddy to consummate the act, Quentin replies, "i was afraid to i was
afraid she might and then it wouldnt have done any good
but if i could tell you we did it would have been so and
then the others wouldnt be so and the world would roar
away"

(p. 195).

This then is the importance of incest

in his mind: it would isolate the two of them from everyone else, and Caddy would belong to him.
Not only has Quentin "lost touch with the eternal," he has also lost touch with both present and future.
His mind is permanently fixed on the past.

Although the

individual who inhabits the aesthetical stage is commonly
in touch only with the present and maintains a detached
view of life, the important characteristic is that he
avoids decisions and choices.

Actually, though, even the

aesthete is forced to make one choice, and that is the
choice not to choose.
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Everything that happens to

Quentin, including his suicide, has its direct relationship to the past.

The past does not blend with his pres-

ent and color it; he has no present, or at most, his past
is his present.

Even the act of suicide does not seem to

occur in the present, for it is a foregone conclusion
from the beginning of Quentin's section in the book.

Re-

garding life or death, he has no choice, since a life
concentrated on the past is not a life anyway.

In effect,

he died on the afternoon Caddy's loss of innocence was
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discovered.
When Kierkegaard speaks of the eternal being embodied in time, he speaks of a phenomenon which has farreaching implications for the existing individual.

The

person who inhabits the religious stage understands and
accepts this phenomenon without question.
has no problem with the concept of time.

He therefore
The ethical

individual believes that he also understands this phenomenon; however, his understanding of the eternal has no
connection with God.

Judge William, one of Kierkegaard's

ethical pseudonyms, has this to say: "The married man,
being a true conqueror, has not killed time but has
saved it and preserved it in eternity.

.He splves

the great riddle of living in eternity and yet hearing
the hall clock strike, and hearing it in such a way that
the stroke of the hour does not shorten but prolong his
eternity . •

"39

Eternity for the ethicist is not

grounded in Christ but in human potentiality.

Although

he does not grasp the significance of time and eternity
according to Kierkegaard's religious viewpoint, the ethicist believes that he understands; therefore, like the
religious individual, he has no problem with the concept
of time.

The aesthete, on the other hand, has no concept

of the eternal being embodied in time; and because he
cannot grasp this concept, time becomes his enemy.
Grimsley explains this way:
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The Diapsalmata [a section of Either/Or]
indicate one of the main problems of the
"aesthetic" life: its failure to deal satisfactorily with the question of time. Although the aesthetic individual lives in one
"natural" dimension, in a single mood or
colour . • • he can establish no genuine
temporal continuity: his life lacks unity
because it consists only of separate discrete moments, as he passes from one feeling
to another without remaining permanently
identified with any. Consequently, complaints about the meaninglessness of his
existence form a characteristic ref rain in
these reflections. The diapsalmatist seems
to exist in a void, with time flowing ceaselessly past him; on other occasions, time
seems to have the opposite effect of standing still . • • . It is characteristic of the
"aesthetic" individual that he should seem
incapable of development.~ 0
The ultimate symbol of reality for Quentin is
time.

Time is what has destroyed the innocence and

peace he experienced as a child.
relationship with Caddy.
would say, "a bitch."

Time has ruined his

It has made her, as Jason

No matter how we as readers inter-

pret Caddy's actions, what essentially troubles Quentin
is his conviction, whether he admits it to himself or
not, that Caddy really is a bitch.

This is what he can-

not bear about Caddy, and what has made her a bitch is
time.

Early in his section of the book, Quentin breaks

his watch in a symbolic attempt to stop time.

But the

watch continues to tick, and throughout the day, he intermittently hears the ticking of this broken indicator
of time.

Chimes mark the hour, the half hour, the

quarter hour, accentuating his inability to escape time.
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Finally, he stops time in the only way that it is possible to do s.o: he commits suicide.
Section II of The Sound and the Fury is, as Edmund Volpe says, "a heartfelt cry of despair, one of the
most moving expressions of disillusionment and suffering
in literature.

It dramatizes that state of mind and

soul that existentialists have described and that Sartre
has termed l'angoise, when man knows absolute despair
and either commits suicide or develops a vision that
gives meaning to existence."'+
ing for his existence

1

w.~ thout

Quentin can find no meanCaddy.

He allows himself

to be overcome by suffering, as the aesthete is very
likely to do", and this results in what George Bedell
calls "existential paralysis."
course open for Quentin.

There is, in effect, no

Perhaps he has taken the words

of his father too literally: "Father said a man is the
sum of his misfortunes.

One day you'd think misfortune

would get tired, but then time is your misfortune Father
said" (p. 123).

Time is indeed Quentin's misfortune,

and his attempt to efface this misfortune leads to his
death.

For Quentin "its not despair until time its not

even time until it was" (p. 197}.

In Kierkegaardian

terms, Quentin's despair is the despair of weakness, a
passive suffering of the self.

Unlike the purely immed-

iate man, Quentin does have some conception of what it
means to have a self, but "he has no consciousness of a
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self which is gained by the infinite abstraction from
everything outward, this naked, abstract self . .

.

which is the first form of the infinite self and the 'forward impulse in the whole process whereby a self infinitely accepts its actual self with all its difficulties
and advantages."~

2

Jason, like Quentin, is trapped in the aesthetical stage, but his manner of dwelling aesthetically is
quite different from Quentin's.

Jason is remarkably suc-

cessful at doing what Quentin subconsciously wanted to do
but could not: he looks upon all people, himself included,
as objects.

Both Caddy and his niece Quentin are used

for the money he can extort from them, and his mother is
important to him only because of the part she plays in
making this extortion possible.

His relationship to

Lorraine, the Memphis prostitute, has its basis only in
sensuousness.

But the erotic quality of this sensuous-

ness lacks the strength of a seducer's relationship with
a woman.

Not once does he speak of Lorraine in a manner

that would indicate even a temporary feeling of desire
or affection.

She is just someone else to be manipu-

lated: "I never promise a woman anything nor let her know
what I'm going to give her.
age them.

That's-the only way to man-

Always keep them guessing.

If you can't think

of any other way to surprise them, give them a bust in
the jaw" (p. 211).
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Jason maintains, through his treatment of others
as objects, the detached view of life common to the aesthete.

His alienation is complete: he loves no one,

trusts no one.

Other people are important to him only

in so far as he can manipulate them for gain.

As Bedell

says, "He stood in no ethical relation to anyone or even
to himself . . . . He would attempt to shore-up his existence by acquisition." 43
Jason, although he appears to be self-assured and
confident, has actually placed himself at the mercy of
fate and external forces.

For every misfortune in his

life, he has someone or something else to blame.

What he

spends most of his time doing is whining and complaining:
"I never had time to go to Harvard like Quentin or drink
myself into the ground like Father.
199).

I had to work" (p.

His having to stay in Jefferson and work as a

clerk in someone else's store is attributed to the failure of Herbert Head, Caddy's husband, to set Jason up in
his bank as he had promised.

"Then when she sent Quentin

home for me to feed too I says I guess that's right too,
instead of me having to go way up

~orth

for a job they

sent the job down here to me . . . " (p. 214).

Bitterness

regarding this broken promise is one of the few things
from the past that troubles Jason, and it surfaces during
his most hateful actions toward others.

The first time

that Caddy returns to see Quentin, he allows her to do so
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only for a second (for which Caddy has to pay him one
hundred dollars).

Then, when he learns that Caddy did

not take the next train out of town, he threatens to
make it impossible for her ever to see Quentin again and
thereby gets her to leave.

Immediately afterwards he

says, "I reckon you'll think twice before you deprive me
of a job that was promised me.

I was a kid then.

lieved folks when they said they'd do things.
learned better since" (p. 224).
sponsibility for his own life.

I be-

I've

Jason accepts no reHe cherishes suffering

as a way to avoid making choices.

He tells himself his

family is to blame for his predicament when in fact it
is he himself who is the problem.

He does not realize

that he can choose his own being and therefore is trapped
in despair.
Although Jason does see some events in the past
as

significant~Herbert's

promise to get him a job, his

father's alcoholism, the selling of Benjy's pasture to
pay for Quentin's schooling and Caddy's
mind is fixed mainly on the future.

wedding~his

He has, for the most

part, cut himself off from both the past and the present
in his search for the money which he believes will serve
as a reinforcement for himself.

The present is important

only in that this is the time in which he must accumulate
that money.

According to Kierkegaard, "The unhappy per-

son is one who has his ideal, the content of his life,
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the fullness of his consciousness, the essence of his being, in some manner outside himself.
sent, never present to himself." 44
cause of this absence.

He is always abJason is doomed be-

He never becomes reconciled to

time.
Caddy seems almost to dwell in two stages at once,
a phenomenon Kierkegaard says is not possible.

But ac-

cording to Bedell, "Kierkegaard admits that categories
may overlap.

That is to say, although one cannot in-

dwell two modalities simultaneously, one may indwell a
modality that combines characteristics of two or more
categories.

Thus, we often hear Kierkegaard speak of

'the ethico-religious' individual,

'the

aesthetic~ethi

cal' person, aesthetical religiousness,' and so forth."
Caddy dwells in the aesthetic-ethical stage.
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As is char-

acteristic of the aesthete, she lives for the present moment.

In fact, she is the only Compson who does live in

the present.

Eroticism is her dominant characteristic,

but this is not a trait she has chosen, at least not at
first: "There was something terrible in me sometimes at
night I

could see it grinning at me I

could see i t

through them grinning at me through their faces it's gone
now and I'm sick"

{p. 131).

She seems to have chose her

body, but the number of lovers she has indicates a lack
of permanence in her relationships with others; consequently, there is no choice at all.

The Kierkegaardian
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choice is more than a whim.
and commitment.

It involves both inwardness

Caddy's choices of lovers involve

neither of these.

The choices she makes are not even

choices to manipulate others; if anything, she is manipulated by them.

When Quentin wants to know if there

have been very many lovers, she replies, "I dont know
too many • • •

"

But in the next breath she asks, "will

you look after Benjy and Father" (p. 134).

Although she

lives for the present moment, she also possesses an ethical sense of duty.

Even as a child, she is the one who

looks after Benjy and tries to keep the family running
smoothly.

When her mother cries in exasperation over not

being able to quiet Benjy, Caddy, aged seven, says, "Hush,
Mother . . . . You go upstairs and lay down, so you can be
sick.

I'll go get Dilsey" (p. 83).

Years later, she

pleads with Jason to show her daughter Quentin some kindness, to see that she has the kinds of things other girls
have.

In contrast to the other members of the family,

Caddy.does make some choices.

It is her choice to give

Quentin up, although she seems to feel driven to do so.
It is not, however, something someone else forces her to
do.

It is a choice she makes because of a sense of duty,

because she believes the remaining .Compsons can rear the
child better than she.
Mr. and Mrs. Compson, both completely withdrawn
from life, are also aesthetes.

Mrs. Compson is in love
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with suffering.
can.

She cherishes it as only an aesthete

It is her excuse to avoid making any decisions or

choices and allows her to remain shut up in her room,
away from the world, reveling in her interminable illness.

Mr. Compson does nothing except mete out his phi-

losophy to those who will listen.

Bedell characterizes

Mr. Compson as well when he says of Jason, ".

the

person who 'thinks about' life without making the either/
or decision (the metaphysician) dwells in the most refined form of aestheticism." 46

Whereas Mrs. Compson has

her "illness" to keep her apart from the rest of the
world, Mr. Compson has alcoholism.
alienated

fro~

Both are completely

reality.

Of the entire household, Dilsey is the only character able to deal with reality.

"Only Dilsey," Bedell

says, "who lives in time as though it contains eternity,
is able to 'endure' or 'prevail. '" 47
the stage which she inhabits.

Religiousness is

Time is never wrong for

her, even when she has to decipher it by means of a clock
possessing only one hand and always three hours slow: "On
the wall above a cupboard . . . a cabinet clock ticked,
then with a preliminary sound as if it had cleared its
throat, struck five times.
(p. 290).

'Eight oclock,' Dilsey said"

She has not removed herself from the world in

order that God may appear, as the individual who dwells
in religiousness A would do; instead, she is "in the
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world but not of it."

God has come, as far as she is

concerned, and she is able to accept herself because she
knows that she has been accepted by God:
Huh, Dilsey said.
Name aint going to
help him.
Hurt him, neither.
Folks dont
have no luck, changing names.
My name been
Dilsey since fore I could remember and it
be Dilsey when they's long forgot me.
How will they know it's Dilsey, when
it's long forgot, Dilsey, Caddy said.
It'll be in the Book, honey, Dilsey
said.
Writ out.
Can you read it, Caddy said.
Wont have to, Dilsey said.
They'll read
it for me.
All I got to do is say Ise here.
(p. 77)

Suffering to Dilsey is a way of life, but not in
the wame way that it is for the Compsons.
as an integral part of life.

She accepts it

She neither allows it to

govern her life nor revels in it.

It is for her, as for

Kierkegaard's religious individual, a way of serving her
fellows.

She usually manages, although she suffers, to

create a sense of order where none actually exists.

In

the face of her suffering and that of others, religiousness is a force that makes all beings equal.

In Kierke-

gaard's words, "The Christianity of the New Testament is
infinitely high; but . . . it is not high in such a
sense that it has to do with the difference between man
and man with respect to intellectual capacity . . . . No,
it is for all.

Everyone

. if he absolutely wills

it . . . will absolutely put up with everything, suffer
everything . . . then is this infinite height attainable
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to him." 48

While Benjy does not possess the mentality

to choose the religious stage, he too is one of God's
creatures as far as Dilsey is concerned.

When Frony com-

plains about her bringing Benjy to church because people
are beginning to talk, she replies, "Den you send um to
me.

.Tell um de good Lawd dont keer whether he smart

or not.

Dont nobody but white trash keer dat" (p. 306).

We must assume that Dilsey has previously experienced resignation and has subsequently made the "leap"
into the religious stage.

She clearly possesses faith,

and Kierkegaard says that an individual cannot receive
faith without first experiencing resignation: "The infinite resignation is the last stage prior to faith, so
that one who has not made this movement has not faith;
for only in the infinite resignation do I become clear to
myself with respect to my eternal validity, and only then
can there by any question of grasping existence by virtue
of faith." 49

Although we do not see the actual act or

process of resignation within the novel itself (because
we meet Dilsey as a religious character and she remains
in the same stage throughout the book), it must necessarily have taken place.

One does not become religious

without first accepting (choosing) himself and accepting
life as it is, which is essentially· the meaning of resignation.
The characters in The Sound and the Fury are, in
one way or another, representative of each of Kierke-
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gaard's three stages.

In Faulkner's world, as in Kierke-

gaard's, the religious individual is a rarity.

Most of

the major characters in The Sound and the Fury dwell in
the aesthetical stage.

Only one progresses to the aes-

thetic-ethical stage, which is only slightly more satisfactory than the aesthetic, and only one reaches the religious stage.
Jason and Quentin, although both aesthetes, are in
some ways almost exact opposites.

Quentin suffers be-

cause he cannot achieve the personal detachment that he
thinks will ease his suffering, while Jason manages to
maintain a detachment from everyone, including himself.
Quentin's problem with time is the past; Jason's is the
future.

But both Quentin and Jason are aesthetes in that

neither is able to make fundamental choices and neither
is in touch with the eternal.
Mr. and Mrs. Compson are also aesthetes, but their
existence in the aesthetical stage is manifested in a
different manner from that of either Jason or Quentin.
They retreat from life in illness and in alcoholism,
neither participating in nor actively concerned with the
real business of living.

What sense of duty either pos-

sesses is buried beneath the crutch each uses as a means
of escaping life.
no difference.

The fact that they are married makes

The ethical person holds marriage in high

esteem, but it does not follow that marriage makes a person ethical.

Judge William informs us that certain
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aesthetes are quite willing to accept marriage, but
that they attach no real significance to it.

For the

aesthete, marriage is likely to be a mere civil arrangement.

It is quite possible that this is the kind of
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marriage the Compsons have; on the other hand, it is
just as possible that they entered into the marriage
as ethicists and later became aesthetes.
of knowing from the novel itself.

We have no way

We see them through-

out as aesthetes who make no choices, who place themselves at the mercy of fate, and who avoid inwardness and
duty.
Caddy differs from the other Compsons in that she
possesses a sense of duty.

Her category, the aesthetic-

ethical, combines qualities of both the aesthetic and the
ethical stages.

While she is unable to make an ethical

choice (for the most part) and lives primarily for the
moment, her sense of duty places her in the realm of the
ethical.

Her attitude toward time is different also:

she is the only Compson who lives in the present.
In reaching the religious stage, Dilsey achieves a
serenity and an ability to cope with life's problems that
the Compsons lack.

Although she too suffers, she is

quite capable of enduring whatever life has to offer.
she also differs from the Compsons in her attitude toward
time.

She is the only member of the household who is in
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touch with the eternal.
In the characters examined so far, we have seen
that each of Kierkegaard's stages is adequately exemplified; yet still other possibilities exist for the aesthete and the ethicist, as will be seen by examining two
other novels.

In reading Kierkegaard, we find that there

are numerous existential avenues open to the aesthete,
all of which fail.

There is also more than one existen-

tial possibility for the ethicist, though not as many as
for the aesthete.

These too ultimately fail.

But there

is only one possible way of life for the purely religious person, and perhaps this is why so few reach the
religious stage.

This is not to say that those who in-

habit the religious stage are not individuals.

They

naturally have their particular individuality and selfhood.

But all religious individuals must assume the

proper attitude toward suffering; they must all understand and accept the paradoxical idea of the eternal being embodied in time; they must all experience resignation (the choice of selfhood and the pursuit of life regardless of its flaws); and they must all ultimately attain faith.

As aesthetes and aesthetic-ethicists,

Faulkner's major characters in The Sound and the Fury
also exemplify diverse existential possibilities for individuals in these stages.

Only the religious character

stands apart as pursuing one particular way of life.

CHAPTER III
LIGHT IN AUGUST

Light in August has been referred to as "a study

of the attempts of alienated people to flee into some
sort of solidarity." 51

Joe Christmas epitomizes the

alienated person who craves solidarity; but because he
does not actively seek this solidarity, because he does
not even know what it is that he seeks, he remains in
the aesthetical stage of existence, alienated from his
surroundings and lost in the world.
No one, not even Joe himself, knows what his background is.

Because he was called "nigger" by children

at the orphanage where he spent his first five years, he
thinks there might be a black person in his ancestry,
but he is not certain of this.

When he appears in Jef-

ferson, he is described in this way: " . . . there was
something definitely rootless about him, as though no
town nor city was his, no street, no walls, no square of
earth his home.

And . . . he carried his knowledge with

him always as though it were a banner, with a quality
ruthless, lonely, and almost proud."
homeless, he is nameless as well:
40

52

Not only is he
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"His name is what?" one said.
"Christmas."
"Is he a foreigner?"
"Did you ever hear of a white man
named Christmas?" the foreman said.
"I never heard of nobody a-tall named
it," the other said. (pp. 28-29)
Christmas is the name he was given when he was found on
the doorstep of the orphanage when he was an infant, but,
for him and for the people with whom he associates, it
is worse than no name at all because it gives no indication of who he is or what his roots are.
Joe is to remain in this state of not knowing who
he is for the duration of his life.

He is like the young

aesthete that Judge William describes in Eibher/Or.

Life

for the aesthete, according to Judge William, is.a masquerade.

No one succeeds in really knowing him.

The

revelations he makes are_only illusions, for he must preserve his enigmatical mask at all costs.

The aesthete

who assumes this attitude loses his own sense of self.
Judge William states it this way: "In fact you are nothing; you are merely a relation to others, and what you
are you are by virtue of this relation." 53
is this type of aesthete.

Joe Christmas

Throughout the book we see him,

for the most part, only as others see him.
is told from his point of view.

Very little

We get the details of

Joanna's murder, of Joe's subsequent capture, and finally
of his "crucifixion" through the eyes of other characters.
He emerges, therefore, as less than human, as simply a
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thought in somebody else's mind. 5 ~
Whether consciously or not, Christmas works to
prevent others from knowing him.

He does not make the

choice between black and white and will not allow anyone
else to make it.

Whenever he begins to be accepted as a

white man, he takes obvious.steps to deny the label,
while at the same time maintaining a doubt that will not
allow others to classify him in any definite way.

An ex-

ample of this is his answer when Joanna questions him
about his background:
"You dont have any idea who your parents
were?"
If she could have seen his face she would
have found it sullen, brooding.
"Except that
one of them was part nigger. Like I told you
before."
She was still looking at him • • • • "How
do you know that?"
He didn't answer for some time.
Then he
said: "I dent know-it." Again his voice
ceased . . . . Then he spoke again . . . . "If
I'm not, damned if I haven't wasted a lot of
time • " ( p . 2 2 2 - 2 3 )
Christmas' masquerade is only part of the larger
picture of his detachment and alienation.

He follows

scrupulously "A's" command to avoid friendship and marriage.

Lucas Burch is simply· someone he can manipulate.

The relationship between the two has none of the camaraderie of friendship.

Neither trusts the other, and Burch is

actually afraid of Christmas.

Judge William would not be

surprised at their relationship.

He describes the young

aesthete as one who must constantly be in opposition with
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"the other."

Because he is afraid of inwardness, the

opposition must be kept alive; otherwise, he might be
forced into the very thing he fears.

His opposition to

others allows him to remain outside himself.ss
Christmas has kept this opposition alive from the
time he was a child, but nowhere is it more apparent than
in his relationship with Joanna Burden.

Their liaison

from the beginning is one of reciprocal struggle.

Their

first sexual encounter is described in this way: "There
was no feminine vacillation, no coyness of obvious desire and intention to succumb at last.

It was as if he

struggled physically with another man for an object of
no actual value to either, and for which they
on principle alone" (p. 205).

st~uggled

Each treats the other as

an object, and their involvement with each other makes
no progress toward a meaningful relationship.

For Christ-

mas it is nothing more than a way to avoid inwardness.
He thinks, "I better move.

I better get away from here"

(p. 228), but he does not go.

He is trapped in the oppo-

sition that allows him to avoid himself.

Even when he

refuses to see her for long periods of time, he cannot
free himself: " . . . when he first went to work, he
would not need to think of her during the day; he hardly
ever thought of her.

Now he could not help himself.

She

was in his mind so constantly that it was almost as if he
were looking at her, there in the house, patient, waiting,
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inescapable, crazy" (p. 135).
Ultimately, Christmas finds that he cannot escape
an inward look at himself, but he is so accustomed to a
life governed by externals that it does no good.

He

attributes his situation to fate, another external: "And
as he sat in the shadow of the ruined garden on that August night three months later • • • he believed with
calm paradox that he was the volitionless servant of the
fatality in which he believed that he did not believe.
He was saying to himself I had to do it already in the
past tense; I had to do it.

She said so herself"

(p.

245}.

Because he is an aesthete, Joe cannot choose; and
because he cannot choose, he must acquiesce to fate.
Judge William states the aesthete's predicament in this
way: " . • • there comes at last an instant when there no
longer is any question of an either/or, not because he
has chosen but because he has neglected to choose, which
is equivalent to saying, because others have chosen for
him, because he has lost his self." 56
Joe Christmas lives out most of his life in despai~

which Kierkegaard defines as "the disrelationship

in a relation that relates itself to itself." 57

Christ-

mas is not conscious of the despair, but according to
Kierkegaard, "the fact that the man in despair is unaware
that his condition is despair, has nothing to do with the

45

case, he is in despair all the same." 58

The individual

who is unconscious of despair is furthest from the consciousness of himself as spirit.
mas' problem.
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This is Joe Christ-

His is what Kierkegaard calls "the despair-

ing unconsciousness of having a self and an eternal
self.
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Since Joe lacks consciousness of his despair,

Kierkegaard would classify this despair as minimal.

When

consciousness is least, the feeling of despair ·is least.
But, paradoxically, the person who is unaware of his despair is in despair in the most dangerous way, because
through unawareness, the individual is securely in the
power of despair.
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The person who is aware of his de-

spair can strive to eliminate it, but the person who is
unaware of despair is virtually trapped in it.
Joanna Burden is one of the few characters who can
be observed to move from one stage to another.

When she

meets Joe Christmas, we can assume that she has previously lived ethically.

She is a virgin spinster who con-

siders it her duty to help black people to rise above
their "condition," an idea instilled in her by her
father.

She carries out this duty meticulously.

We

learn also that she has made an ethical choice to live
near Jefferson, although the people there shun her.

It

is clear that she has no entanglements that keep her in
Jefferson.
that she is.

She therefore has chosen to be the outcast
She has chosen, as is characteristic of the
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ethicist, to suffer.
With the arrival of Christmas, Joanna moves into
the aesthetical stage, but not entirely.

For Joanna the

ethical has not been "dethroned"* by the aesthetical.
The two stages combine in her and become the aestheticethical.

Her work with the black schools continues, but

her relationship with Joe becomes one of sensuousness or,
to be more specific, eroticism:
At first it shocked him: the abject
fury of the New England glacier exposed to
the fire of the New England biblical hell.
Perhaps he was aware of the abnegation in
it: the imperious and fierce urgency that
concealed an actual despair at frustrate
and irrevocable years, which she appeared
to compensate each night as if she believed
that it would be the last night on earth by
damning herself forever to the hell of her
forefathers, by living not alone in sin but
in filth.
She had an avidity for the forbidden wordsymbols; an insatiable appetite
for the sound of them on his tongue and on
her own.
She revealed the terrible and impersonal curiosity of a child about forbidden subjects and objects; that rapt and
tireless and detached interest of a surgeon
in the physical body and its possibilities.
(pp. 225-26)
This eroticism is dominant only at night: " • • • by day
he would see the calm, coldfaced, almost manlike, almost
middleaged woman who had lived for twenty years alone
• . . " (p. 226).

During this period, which Joe refers

to as "the second phase," Joanna seems to be an ethicist
during the day and an aesthete at night.
*See p.

15.
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The phase does not last, however.
eventually to the ethical stage.

She returns

All sex activity is

terminated, and her business with Joe is now strictly
related to duty.

She tells him of a time when she told

her father that she must escape the shadow cast by the
black race:
rise.

'You cannot,' he said.

'You must struggle,

But in order to rise, you must raise the shadow

with you . . . . you can never lift it to your level.
But escape it you cannot.
is God's curse.

The curse of the black race

But the curse of the white race is the

black man who will be forever God's chosen because He
once cursed Him'

(p. 222).

Joe comes to represent a

.means by which Joanna can "raise the shadow."

She there-

fore asks that he declare himself black, attend a black
college, and study law under a black lawyer.

But Joe,

being trapped in aestheticism and therefore having made
no real choice between black and white, will not cooperate.

Joanna resorts to prayer and thereby seals her

fate: "She ought not to started praying over me.

She

would have been all right if she hadn't started praying
over me" (p. 93).

Joe's resistance is the typical aes-

thetic resistance of a shift toward the ethical or the
religious in any relationship.

Joanna becomes the burden

from which he must inevitably free himself, and the only
way that he can be free of her is by killing her.
The aesthetic in Joanna is "dethroned" when she
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returns to the ethical stage: it does not disappear totally, but it is no longer a motivating force of her existence.

In attempting to use Joe in order to "raise

the shadow," she denies his humanity, but she does not
do so consciously.

Her intention is just the opposite.

She believes she is doing the only thing that will give
Joe humanity; thus, before she explains to him what she
wants him to do, she asks, "Do you realise
you are wasting your life?" (p. 234).

. that

Her motivation is

her ethical sense of duty, but her aestheticism is still
evident in that she manipulates Joe for her own ends.
Joanna clearly reaches toward the religious stage
during the last months of her life, but she never attains
it.

At first she actively resists the impulse.

the end of the period in which

~he

Toward

inhabits the aesthe-

tic-ethical stage, we read,
What was terrible was that she did not want
to be saved.
"I'm not ready to pray yet,"
she said aloud, quietly, rigid, soundless,
her eyes wide open, while the moon poured
and poured into the window, filling the room
with somethin0 cold and irrevocable and wild
with regret.
"Dont make me have to pray yet.
Dear God, let me be damned a little longer,
a little while." She seemed to see her
whole past life, the starved years, like a
gray tunnel, at the far and irrevocable end
of which, as unfading as a reproach, her
naked breast of three short years ago ached
as though in agony, virgin and crucified;
"Not yet, dear God. Not yet, dear God."
(p. 231)
When she does give in to the impulse, after her return

49
to the ethical stage, her resignation is evidenced by a
search for the immanental relationship to God and the destruction of selfhood which are emphasized in religiousness A:
She prayed again. She spoke quietly,
with that abjectness of pride. When it was
necessary to use the symbolwords which he
had taught her, she used them, spoke them
forthright and without hesitation, talking
to God as if He were a man in the room with
two other men.
She spoke of herself and of
him as of two other people, her voice still,
monotonous, sexless • . . • (p. 245)
The religiousness Joanna seeks, according to
Kierkegaard, is not religiousness at all: "The immediate
relationship to God is paganism, and only after the
breach has taken place can there be any question of a
true God-relationship." 62

Furthermore, "a direct rela-

tionship between one spiritual being and another, with
respect to the essential truth, is unthinkable.

If such

a relationship is assumed, it means that one of the parties has ceased to be spirit.n 63

For Kierkegaard, the

only true spiritual relationship is one of inwardness:
"Within the individual man there is a potentiality (man

.
is potentially spirit) which is awakened in inwardness to
become a God-relationship, and then it becomes possible
to see God everywhere.

The sensuous distinctions of the

great, the astonishing, the shrieking superlatives of a
southern people, constitute a retreat to idolatry, in
comparison with the spiritual relationship of inwardness. 116 '+
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When Joanna seeks to destroy her selfhood in order
to have a relationship with God, as she implies when in
her prayer she speaks of herself and Joe as two other
people, she annihilates the quality necessary for inwardness and a real spiritual relationship.

Thus she never

attains religiousness because she is looking for it outside herself.
In a Kierkegaardian hierarchy, Joanna emerges as
a much more complicated individual than does Joe Christmas, and she attains a higher level of existence.

She

is able to achieve ethical inwardness, which leads her
to seek God; but in seeking God, she denies her own selfhood, thus destroying the inwardness she needs in order
to find Him.

She is just beginning the throes of resig-

nation, but she does not realize that in order to choose
God, she must first choose herself.

In Kierkegaard's

words,
For the act of resignation faith is not reauired, for what I gain by resignation is
my eternal consciousness, and this is a
purely philosophical movement which I dare
say I am able to make if it is required, and
which I can train myself to make, for whenever any finiteness would get the mastery
over me, I starve myself until I can make
the movement, for my eternal consciousness
is my love to God, and for me this is higher
than everything. 65
Christmas is much simpler to classify than Joanna.
He remains the same throughout his life, never gaining
the necessary sense of self to make the leap out of the
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aesthetical stage.

He is trapped in the despair which

results from a failure to recognize the self as spirit.
But there is a kinship between Joe and Joanna.
Although Joanna is just the opposite of Joe in her attitude toward blacks, she is just the same in the position
in which she finds herself because of this attitude.
Joe considers being black a kind of damnation.

Joanna,

on the other hand, has the idea that her salvation lies
in helping blacks.

Both are caught midway between two

extremes: black and white.

Joe is caught in the middle

because he can identify with neither; Joanna, because
she believes that her father was correct in his assessment that both races are cursed.

It is clear that Faulk-

ner intends us to see a similarity in their characters,
and he insures the recognition by giving the two of them
similar names.

In the Kierkegaardian scheme, the kin-

ship between Joe and Joanna places both in despair because they both "obscurely repose or terminate in an abstract universality,"* namely, race consciousness.
One other similarity in the personalities of Joe
and Joanna must be mentioned.-

Both find that life is

unbearable and decide to end it.

We have seen that Joe's

resistance of Joanna's attempt to release him from aestheticism leads him to murder her.

But a closer look

shows that Joanna's murder is a kind of suicide as far
*Seep. 17.
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Joe is concerned.

He knows that he will be caught, but

even more important is the fact that he does not try
very hard to avoid being caught.

The fact that he eludes

the sheriff and the hounds for a week is largely due to
their own ineptitude.
stay away from them.

He puts forth no real effort to
For a while it is almost a game to

him, but then he gets tired of running and walks into a
town where he is sure to be recognized.

He wants to be

caught and punished just as he wanted to be punished
when he ate the dietitian's toothpaste as a child; and
he certainly knows what the punishment will be.

He will

have to undergo a modern-day crucifixion, which is what
he thinks he deserves.
Joanna has also decided on suicide.

When Joe re-

fuses to pray with her on the night before her death,
she draws an old pistol and fires at him.
not fire, however.

The gun does

We learn her purpose when Joe stops

to examine the pistol he took with him when he left her
bedroom:
The match burned down and went out, yet he
still seemed to see th~ ancient thing with
its two loaded chambers; the one upon which
the hammer had already fallen and which had
not exploded, and the other upon which no
hammer had yet fallen but upon which a hammer had been planned to fall .. 'For her and
for me,' he said. (p. 250)
For both Joanna and Joe, despair leads (though in a
roundabout way) to suicide.

But to Kierkegaard, suicide
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is not a satisfactory solution because it is a rebellion
against God.

6 6

CHAPTER IV
ABSALOM, ABSALOMl

The presence of Thomas Sutpen pervades every page
of Absalom, Absalom!

Not for one moment is the reader

allowed to lose himself in details of another character's life.

Although he has been dead for forty-one

years when the novel opens, he is the character who
really lives in the book.

Perhaps the reason is that

even after his death and the passage of time, he still
remains an enigma to those who know and know of him.
As difficult as it is to think of the word ethical
in terms of Stupen, he dwells in the aesthetic-ethical
stage.

Although the aesthetic characteristics outnumber

the ethical, they do not dominate.

Both are present in

him throughout the book, and we never see him as more
one than the other.

Sutpen possesses none of the erotic

qualities characteristic of the aesthete.

Instead, his

aestheticism is seen through his detachment, his identification of himself through externals, his treatment of
others as objects, and his attitude.toward time.

The

ethical aspects of his character are seen only through
the choices he makes and his attitude toward fate.
54
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Sutpen's aesthetical detachment is posited in the
opening pages of the book.

As far as the people of

Jefferson know, he has no roots.

He is to them as to

Miss Rosa, "a man who rode into town out of nowhere
with a horse and two pistols and a herd of wild beasts
II
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They know nothing of his background and

therefore do not trust him: "He came here with a horse
and two pistols and a name nobody ever heard before,
knew for certain was

hi~

own any more than the horse was

his own or even the pistols, seeking some place to hide
himself . . . " (p. 15).
The people of Jefferson are never to learn very
much about Sutpen's background.

He tells his

s~ory

to

only one man, Quentin's grandfather, and even in telling
the story, he maintains his aesthetical detachment:
" . . . he was not talking about himself.
a story.

He was telling

He was not bragging about something he had

done; he was just telling a story about something a man
named Thomas Sutpen had experienced, which would have
been the same story if the man had had no name at all,
if it had been told about any man or no man over whiskey
at night" (p. 247).

It is this detachment which

leads Rosa Coldfield to say, forty-one years after Sutpen' s death, "He was not articulated in this world.
was a walking shadow.

He

He was ·the light-blinded bat-like

image of his own torment cast by the fierce demoniac

56

lantern up from beneath the earth's crust and hence in
retrograde, reverse . . . " {p. 171).
Like Kierkegaard's immediate man, Sutpen recognizes that he has a self only through externals.*

The

most obvious example of this characteristic in Sutpen
is his "design."

Sutpen was innocent when his family

came down from the mountains of West Virginia and settled in Tidewater.

At ten years old,

. . . he had never even heard of, never
imagined a place, a land divided neatly
up and actually owned by men who did
nothing but ride over it on fine horses
or sit in fine clothes on the galleries
of big houses while other people worked
for them; he did not even imagine then
that there was any such way to live or ·
want to live, or that there existed all
the objects to be wanted which there were~
or that the ones who owned the objects not
only could look down on the ones that
didn't, but could be supported in the
downlooking not only by the others who
owned objects too but by the very ones
that were looked down on that didn't own
objects and knew they never would. {p. 221)
Into this strange, new universe, Thomas Sutpen is cast;
and, according to Quentin's grandfather at least, he
never loses his innocence.

He soon learns, however,

that not only is there a difference between white men
and black men, but that there is also a difference between white men and white men.

And shortly after he

gains this knowledge, something happens that is the

*Seep. 7.
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beginning of his design.

His father sends him to the

plantation on which they work to deliver a message.

He

approaches the front door: " . . • and he never even remembered what the nigger said, how it was the nigger
told him, even before he had time to say what he came
for, never to come to that front door again but to go
around to the back" (p. 232) .
Years later, when Sutpen tells the story to Quentin's grandfather, he insists that the incident did not
anger him, but "he knew that something would have to be
done about it: he would have to do something about it
in order to live with himself for the rest of his life
." (p. 234).

He is not fighting against

th~

black

man who sent him to the back door but against the system, the system represented by the man who owns the
plantation.

He finds himself compelled to combat in

some way both this plantation owner and the others of
his kind, and in order to do so he must gain the same
material things that they have: land, slaves, and money.
Thus begins Sutpen's design, and it is to govern
his life until he dies.

He has no time for inwardness

because the entire meaning of his life exists in this
external plan.
Obsession with the accomplishment of his design
leads Sutpen to use other people as objects, which is
typical of the aesthete.

Because a wife is essential
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to his plans, he marries: "
father • .

. . and he told grand-

. how he had put his first wife aside like

eleventh- and twelfth-century kings did:

'I found that

she was not and could never be, through no fault of her
own, adjunctive or incremental to the design which I
had in mind, so I provided for her and put her aside'"
(p. 240).

This wife, Eulalia, can play no part in Sut-

pen's design because he discovers that she is not racially pure, that one of her not so distant ancestors
was partially black.
All individuals are objects to Sutpen and are important only in so far as they are adjunctive to his
plan.

Ironically, it is partly because of his inhumane

treatment of these others whom he considers necessary
to his· design that his plan fails.

Eulalia is driven

to her desire for vengeance because in putting her
aside, Sutpen denies her humanity.

Miss Rosa Cold-

field' s outrage stems from the same ·kind of treatment.
Shreve is correct in classifying Sutpen as less than
human: " . . . if he hadn't been a demon
wouldn't have had to go out there

. she
and find instead

of a widowed Agamemnon to her Cassandra an ancient
stiff-jointed Pyramus to her eager though untried Thisbe
who could approach her in this unbidden April's compounded demonry and suggest that they breed together for
test and sample and if it was a boy they would marry"
(p. 177).

His final attempt to reestablish his dynasty
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is yet another example of his denial of another person's
humanity.

He is no longer concerned with a suitable

wife; all he wants now is a son.

The young granddaugh-

ter of Wash Jones will serve the purpose.

But when she

bears a daughter instead of a son, he says, "Well,
Milly,

too bad you're not a mare like Penelope.

could give you a stall in the stable"

Then I

(p. 185).

Sutpen's mind, for the most part, is fixed on the
future.

There is a brief period when his design seems

to be working during which he inhabits the present, but
as soon as something threatens his plan, his mind becomes fixed on the future and the reestablishment of his
design.

aga~nst

He is therefore constantly fighting

as the aesthete commonly does.

time,

Even as a young man, he

shows evidence of this fight against time:

"

. he

was at this time completely the slave of his secret and
furious impatience, his conviction gained from whatever
that recent experience had been .

. of a need for

haste, of time fleeing beneath him, which was to drive
him for the next five years .

. roughly until about

nine months before his son was born" (p. 34).
the fight is more desperate: ".

Later,

• he realized that

there was more in his problem than just lack of time,
that the problem contained some super-distillation of
this lack: that he was now past sixty and that possibly
he could get but one more son, had at best but one more
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son in his loins, as the old cannon might know when it
has just one more shot in its corporeality"

(p. 279).

In his fight against time, Sutpen shows that he
is not in touch with the eternal.

He thinks that he

can posit the eternal in himself through having sons,
but in Kierkegaard's scheme, one can gain the eternal
only by recognizing himself as spirit.

Although Sut-

pen' s fight against time is an aesthetical characteristic, his means of seeking the eternal is typical of the
ethicist.

It is a matter of human potentiality and has

no connection with God.

But for Kierkegaard, gaini'ng

the eternal is impossible without first attaining paradoxical religiousness.

In fact, attainment of the true

God-relationship and attainment of the eternal occur
simultaneously.
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For Kierkegaard, neither the aesthetical nor the
ethical stage of existence is satisfactory, although the
ethical is a higher stage than the aesthetical.

The

highest end is attainment of the religious stage, and
for Kierkegaard, attainment of this end is the only possible way of living a satisfactory life.

Sutpen's de-

sire to project himself through posterity resembles an
ethical resignation: he does seek to "choose himself
absolutely,"* but this is only half of what Kierkegaard
means by resignation.
*See p. 10.

The other half is God: "This
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movement [resignation] I make by myself, and what I
gain is myself in my eternal consciousness, in blissful
agreement with my love for the Eternal Being." 69
So far we have seen, for the most part, only Sutpen's aesthetical characteristics.

The ethical traits,

though less numerous, are no less convincing.

The ethi-

cal individual, as we have seen, is involved in making
choices.

Because he believes that he knows the right

choice, he chooses with a kind of permanence.
cal choice is marked by its seriousness.
cist believes at least.)

The ethi-

(So the ethi-

Judge William explains this

way:
When a man deliberates aesthetically upon
a multitude of life's problems . • • he
does not easily get one either/or, but a
whole multiplicity, because the determining
factor in the choice is not accentuated, and
because when one does not choose absolutely
one chooses only for the moment, and therefore can choose something different the
next moment. The ethical choice is therefore in a certain sense much easier, much
simpler, but in another sense it is infinitely harder. He who would define his
task ethically has ordinarily not so considerable a selection to choose from; on
the other hand, the act pf choice has far
more importance for him.
If you will understand me aright, I should like to say that
in making a choice it is not so much a
question of choosing the right as of the
energy, the earnestness, the pathos with
which one chooses. 70
The major choice that Sutpen makes is the one that
initiates his design.

Once made, nothing ever happens
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that alters this fundamental choice.

Instead, all of

the other choices he makes have their direct relationship to it.

After his first wife is put aside because

of a trace of black blood in her veins, he does not
give up.

He puts this wife aside, moves from the West

Indies (where he had gone to become rich and had begun
to succeed) to Jefferson, swindles a hundred square
miles of land from an Indian, builds a huge house on it,
furnishes it by shady means never explained, and chooses
another wife.

He chooses another

love or even becomes infatuated

wife~not

with~simply

falls in
chooses be-

cause she is not rich enough to look down her nose at
him but well-bred enough to be a suitable mistress for
his house.
The ethical aspect of Sutpen's nature is not evidenced by the fact that he marries but by the quality of
the choices he makes.

Marriage is simply a choice that

is necessary to the success of his design.

We have no

problem understanding that Eulalia would not have been
cast aside except for the black blood he learns that
she has.

Almost any woman will serve in his design as

long as she is lily white, respectable, and able to bear
children~sons,

that is.

His choice of marriage is an

ethical one because of the sense of finality with which
he makes it each time.
Sutpen's attitude toward fate is another aspect
of his ethical character.

He does not acquiesce to
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fate, even when he discovers at age fifty-nine that his
design has for a second time been destroyed.

When he

returns from the Civil War, he begins immediately to
try to restore "Sutpen's Hundred."

Although he is un-

successful (his hundred square miles of land being reduced to approximately one), it is not because he refused or was afraid to fight.

Failure of another part

of his design is evident at this time also.

Because of

his repudiation of his first wife (who does not simply
disappear into his past but seeks and attains vengeance),
the son (Henry) in whom he has trusted to perpetuate
his dynasty is lost to him.

He fights against fate this

time by· seeking to father a son by Wash Jones' young
granddaughter.

These methods of resisting fate are

typical of those he has used throughout his life, and
he dies still resisting fate.

Wash Jones cannot forgive

the insult inflicted upon his granddaughter and kills
Sutpen because of it, but not without a fight.

Sutpen

does not exit life with a whimper that indicates defeat.
The midwife who attended Milly hears Sutpen resist
Wash's assault: "'Stand back, Wash!' sharp now, and then
she heard the whip on Wash's face . . . " (p. 286).

Sut-

pen resists the doom that fate seems to have reserved
for him until his life is over.
It is important to note here that the sense in
which Sutpen possesses ethical characteristics is not to
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be confused with the sense in which ethicism denotes
morality.

He merely possesses some of the characteris-

tics common to the ethical individual.

Granted, the

direction in which he takes his ethicism would hardly
be considered moral, particularly in the manner in which
he chooses his wives or mates; but Kierkegaard himself,
in speaking of the ethical principle of choice, has
stated that " . . • if a mistake is to be made, it is
worse to become a fickle-minded waverer than resolutely
to carry out what has been decided upon; for a habit of
vacillation is the absolute ruin of every spiritual relationship." 72
Sutpen's aesthetic-ethical qualities are evident
in all of the major events of his life.

His design is

both aesthetic and ethical at once, and both the aesthetic and the ethical are evident in the choices that are
related to this design.

It is impo·ssible to say that he

is aesthetical at one time and ethical at another; the
two categories are iptermingled so that both operate
within him at the same time.

Thus his design is aesthe-

tical in that it is an external through which he gives
meaning to his life, but at the same time it is ethical
in that it is a serious choice to which he is bound as
the purely aesthetic individual could never be.

Similar-

ly, sutpen's choices of wives are .aesthetical in that he
uses these women as mere objects to further his design,
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but at the same time they are ethical in that they are
also serious choices which he never seeks to alter unless forced to for the good of his design.
One purely aesthetic quality Sutpen possesses in
his detachment from others, but it is not a characteristic that can be seen to operate alone in him at any particular time.
in his life.

The design overshadows everything else
He is ethically bound to it from his boy-

hood, and not one of his aesthetic qualities ever supersedes it for a moment.

To classify him as purely ethi-

cal could not be considered, but to classify him as
purely aesthetical would be just as serious a mistake.

CONCLUSION

Although Kierkegaard considers a step-by-step progression through the three stages neither necessary nor
preferable, it is clear that the aesthetical stage is
the lowest stage of human existence, that the ethical is
higher than the aesthetical but not the ultimate, and
that the religious stage is the highest attainable in an
individual's quest for meaningful and satisfactory existence.

The casting of the characters previously dis-

cussed into a Kierkegaardian framework or hierarchy will
therefore not detract from Kierkegaard's concept of the
three basic categories, but will enlighten us as to the
reasons for the failures and successes of Faulkner's
characters.
Let· us begin, then, at the beginning, with a comparison and contrast of the characters who dwell in the
lowest stage of existence, the aesthetical.

Quentin,

Jason, Mr. and Mrs. Compson, and Joe Christmas all inhabit this stage.

Each character inhabits this stage in

his own individual way, but the result is basically
the same for all.
We have seen that Quentin never makes a fundamental choice regarding his own being.
66

This is also true
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of Jason, Mr. and Mrs. Compson, and Joe Christmas.
Quentin cannot make this choice because the inwardness
necessary in order to choose is too painful for him;
Jason, because he is too involved in making money and
blaming others for his misfortune to know that the
choice exists.

The older Compsons subconsciously use

illness and alcoholism in order to avoid making any
choices at all; and Joe Christmas, in almost total unawareness that he even has a self, is obviously unable
to choose his own particular bein9.
Quentin possesses more inwardness than the other
aesthetes, but this inwardness is so painful that it
yields negative rather than positive results.

Were he

willing to accept life with the knowledge that it contains imperfections, his capacity for self-reflection
would release him from the despair of aestheticism.

As

it is, he seeks to withdraw frc:rr. 1 if e and deny its reality; but since he cannot completely do so, the only
other alternative he can recognize is suicide.
Joe Christmas is also afraid of inwardness, whether he knows it or not.

He avoids inwardness through

the opposition he keeps alive between himself and others.
In this way at least he is a little more successful than
Quentin at dwelling in the aesthetical stage.

He is

able to avoid conscious despair, but it is a deceptive
avoidance at most.

He is in despair all the same.
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On the surface his despair yields a different result
than Quentin's.
cide.

It leads to murder rather than to sui-

Joanna tries to bring him out of his aestheti-

cism, but he is not conscious enough of his own selfhood to accept such a progression.

He must therefore

be rid of her in order to continue to dwell in the despair which holds him prisoner.

But Joe's realization

that fate has decreed that he must murder Joanna is the
same as a realization that he must also destroy himself.
His death is in actuality no less a suicide than Quentin's.
Although Jason is also a victim of despair, he is
able to do what Quentin would like to do but cannot; he
is a master at using people as objects for his own gain.
In inwardness he stands above Joe Christmas but below
Quentin; in the ability to actively participate in the
process of living, he stands only slightly above both.
Perhaps his ability to remain detached is responsible
for his success at manipulating others and himself.
There is no Joanna Burden in his life to threaten his
detachment, and there is not.enough self-reflection in
his being to cause any reluctance or remorse regarding
his treatment of others.
Mr. and Mrs. Compson, like Quentin and Joe Christmas, are both withdrawn from life; but instead of taking
the option of

s~icide,

as Quentin does and as Joe
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Christmas does indirectly, they use alcohol and illness
as a means of escaping life and inwardness.

Jason uses

money in a similar way, but what involvement he does
have with life is a result of his drive for the acquisition of money.

Money is still a means of escape, how-

ever, because his obsession with it helps him to avoid
inwardness.
Mr. Compson is not entirely like his wife.

He

possesses at least as much inwardness as Quentin does,
whereas Mrs. Compson possesses virtually none.

But his

inwardness does not lead anywhere in a quest for selfhood.

He reflects about the world and other people; he

concerns himself with philosophical questions and answers; he even touches on what it means to live a meaningful life.

But none of his thinking about life is re-

lated strictly to himself; therefore, he is never led
to make a choice that would release him from aestheticism. He possesses an inwardness that is actually void
of subjectivity, and it leads nowhere.
All of the aesthetic characters discussed have a
problem reconciling themselves to time.

They cannot

grasp the idea of the eternal being embodied in time,
and thus their minds become fixed upon one temporal dimension.

For Quentin and his parents it is the past;

for Jason, the future; for Joe Christmas, it is the
present.

Kierkegaard sees this kind of existence as
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divisive in contrast to that existence which recognizes
the eternal as part of the finitude of time.
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As has been mentioned previously, existence to
Kierkegaard is a state of becoming.

Unfortunately, ex-

isting individuals are not always aware of this fact.
They decide, if anything, to "be themselves" rather than
to become themselves and thereby trap themselves in a
stage that leads nowhere.
edly pessimistic.

Kierkegaard's view is decid-

He believes that most people, even

those who believe they are Christians, exist in either
aesthetic or aesthetic-ethical categories.*

A survey

of Faulkner's major works indicates the same kind of
pessimism.

Most of his characters dwell in the.same

two categories.
The aesthetic-ethical category is slightly more
satisfactory than the purely aesthetic category.

Indi-

viduals who dwell in this stage usually manage to convince themselves that there is some meaning for their
existence, though to Kierkegaard the meaning they find
is a misconception.

Caddy, Joanna Burden, and Sutpen

inhabit this stage.
Caddy emerges as somewhat better able to cope
with life than the other Compsons.

Although the fact

that she lives for the moment is a characteristic of

*See pp. 20-21.
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the aesthete, this characteristic does allow her to accept life as it is; and her acceptance of life as it is
enables her to take an active participation in it.

Part

of this participation is evidenced in her sensuality,
but another part is evidenced in her ethical sense of
duty.

Her sense of duty, like Joanna's, has its basis

in universal concepts of right and wrong.

Sutpen, on

the other hand, erects his own ethical norm in his "design."

His duty is faithfulness to that design rather

than to the demands of society.

His problem with racism

is more easily handled than Joe Christmas' because he
meets it head-on rather than avoiding the issue.
The aesthetic qualities of Caddy, Joanna, and
Sutpen are similar in some ways but different in others.
Both Caddy and Joanna have erotic characteristics, whereas Sutpen has none.

Neither character is in touch with

the eternal, although Joanna makes an attempt to gain it.
Joanna lives most of her life in the past, while Sutpen's
mind is fixed on the future.

Their attitudes toward time

are as aesthetic as Caddy's, although Caddy lives for the
present moment.

Both Sutpen·and Joanna use people as

objects, and both Caddy and Joanna (at times) use their
own bodies as objects.
Joanna and Sutpen at one time or another ethically
resist the suffering meted out by fate, but Sutpen is
more actively involved in this resistance.

Joanna
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chooses suffering, as is characteristic of the ethicist,
as a way of affirming herself.

She does not make an

active attempt to eliminate it; instead, she simply
faces up to it by refusing to leave Jefferson.

Sutpen

does not really choose suffering, but he is constantly
fighting to keep it at bay.
destruction of his design.

Suffering to him is the
Fate is its agent; thus his

fight is directed against fate.
Both Caddy and Sutpen are unwilling to make the
leap out of the category in which they dwell.
is willing, but not capable of doing so.

Joanna

When she can-

not make the leap, she decides upon suicide, but she
intends to take Joe's life first.

The problem is solved

for her when her attempt fails and Joe's succeeds.
For both Sutpen and Joanna, dwelling in the aesthetic-ethical stage results in despair.

Joanna is more

aware of her despair than Sutpen because she possesses
more inwardness than he does, but Sutpen's despair is
just as great as hers.

The difference is that he does

not stop fighting it long enough to reflect upon it.
For the most part, the characters in the aesthetical stage withdraw from life.

They maintain a detach-

ment from everything and everyone,· sometimes including
even themselves.

The aesthetic-ethicists face the same

kinds of problems that the aesthetes face, but usually
their ethical characteristics allow them to participate
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more actively in life and to communicate better with
others.
Joanna Burden is the one character from the three
novels who can be seen to inhabit the ethical stage.
Although the aesthetical has merely been "dethroned,"
she now possesses more of the inwardness necessary for
spiritual fulfillment.

The ethical becomes the govern-

ing principle of her life, while the aesthetical is
subordinate to that principle.

Joanna thus inhabits a

higher stage of existence than the characters discussed
so far, but her preoccupation with the past and her consequent sense of guilt present problems which she cannot
overcome.

Joanna's renunciation of sex when she makes

the leap from the aesthetic-ethical stage to the ethical
stage is unavoidable because she believes she has committed some sin in cohabiting with one who is below her
level.

When she begins the act of resignation, she

fails to progress beyond ethicism because she seeks to
destroy her inwardness.

The result is despair.

Kierkegaard cites two basic ways of being in despair.

The first is "the despair which is unconscious

that it is despair, or the despairing unconsciousness
of having a self and an eternal self·."

The second-

"the despair which is conscious of being despair, as also
it is conscious of being a slef wherein there is after
all something eternal"-is made manifest in one of two
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ways: "in despair at not willing to be itself [the despair of weakness], or in despair at willing to be itself
[the despair of defiance or self-assertion]." 7

3

Joe

Christmas, Jason, Mr. and Mrs. Compson, and Caddy experience the first kind of despair.

All are virtually un-

conscious of the fact that they are in despair.

Quentin

and Joanna are conscious of their despair and therefore
experience the second kind.

It is a despair of weakness

because they do nothing to alleviate it, but they are
conscious of it as despair.

Theirs is the despair of

not willing to be themselves, which is initiated either
by something earthly, by a concern about the eternal,
or by a concern about themselves.

Sutpen is also con-

scious of his despair, especially toward the end of his
life; but his is the despair of willing to be himself,
or the the despair of self-assertion.
Above Joanna and all the other characters, we find
Dilsey, a black woman who, in these three novels at
least, is the only character who reaches the stage of
paradoxical religiousness.*

She is the only character

who has no problem with the concept of time, the only
one who does not let herself be overcome by suffering,
the only one whose life is not governed by externals.

*Bedell goes even further: "The one figure in the
Faulknerian canon who stands clearly within the category of paradoxical religiousness is Dilsey . • . (p.
244) •
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She is one of those individuals of whom Faulkner says,
"They endured."
Faulkner seems to be saying that the simple people
like Dilsey are the ones able to achieve religiousness.
Kierkegaard, on the other hand, believes that religiousness is for all, regardless of intellectual ability.*
At any rate, Faulkner is not nearly so serious about
religion as Kierkegaard is.

In his words, "The writer

must write out of his background.

He must write out of

what he knows and the Christian legend is part of any
Christian's background . . . . It's just there.

It has

nothing to do with how much of it I might believe or
disbelieve-it's just there.
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If we look at the characters in his novels, Faulkner seems to be as pessimistic about the fate of mankind
as Kierkegaard, who believes that only a few people attain the religious stage 75 and that therefore only a
few people live satisfactory lives.

But when we compare

Faulkner's assertions with those of Kierkegaard, Faulkner emerges as the more optimistic of the two:"I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail
. because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance.
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Dilsey is not the only character in Faulkner who

*See p. 35.
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"endures" or "prevails," but the others will not stand
the· test of Kierkegaard's religious stage.

For Faulk-

ner, the characters who prevail or endure are those who
find meaningful relationships with others, those who
see a spiritual kinship with the natural world, or
those who, like Dilsey, accept themselves and life as
they are and find meaning for their existence through
faith.
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